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Abstract. A model of an organism as an autonomous intelligent system has been 
proposed. This model was used to analyze learning of an organism in various 
environmental conditions. Processes of learning were divided into two types: strong and 
weak processes taking place in the absence and the presence of aprioristic information 
about an object respectively. Weak learning is synonymous to adaptation when 
aprioristic programs already available in a system (an organism) are started. It was 
shown that strong learning is impossible for both an organism and any autonomous 
intelligent system. It was shown also that the knowledge base of an organism cannot be 
updated. Therefore, all behavior programs of an organism are congenital. A model of a 
conditioned reflex as a series of consecutive measurements of environmental parameters 
has been advanced. Repeated measurements are necessary in this case to reduce the 
error during decision making. 
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Introduction 
The ability of animals to learn, that is, react adequately to the 
appearance of an unknown image in their sight, is considered as one of 
basic properties of living systems (see, for example, (McFarland, 1985)), 
which was modeled time and again (Bush & Mosteller, 1955, Staddon, 
1983, Bergman & Feldman, 1995, Dukas, 1998, Kerr & Feldman, 2003). It 
is generally agreed that some part of information about the state of an 
organism is encoded in genes (is congenital), while the other part is 
acquired during learning by experience. However, although models of 
living systems are many, mechanisms of learning are far from being clear. 
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In particular, a detailed analysis of the means by which an organism 
receives information about the environment and makes decisions on 
adequate actions reveals a contradiction. 
On the other hand, development of a self-learning system capable 
of acquiring knowledge from the environment is one of central problems in 
the theory of the artificial intelligence. Some researchers think that such 
systems already exist or will be created in the nearest future (cognitive 
computers, see, for example, (Brachman, 2001)). However, the analysis of 
the state of the art with learning systems shows that neither of them can set 
itself new tasks and adapt to an arbitrary environment (Andrew, 1983, 
Papert, 1980, Spier & McFarland, 1997, Gupta & Sinha, 1996, White & 
Sofge, 1992). Models of the adaptive behavior of agents should also a 
priori include all properties, which these agents may ever possess (for 
example, (Maturana & Varela, 1980, Rich & Knight, 1991, Iizuka & 
Ikegami, 2004)). New properties of agents do not appear in this case. Is this 
a temporary drawback of modern systems or such a system cannot be 
created in principle? 
At the same time, frequently the notions "learning" and 
"adaptation" are not clearly defined, leading to misunderstanding. 
The present paper deals with an alternative model of the 
behavior of organisms and intelligent systems, which is based on the 
operation of aprioristic programs. 
 
1. What do the terms "learning" and "adaptation" imply? 
 
The notion "learning" is used in a number of sciences: information 
science, psychology, physiology, ethology, etc. Hence, this notion is 
defined differently (see, for example, (Luger, 2003)). The ability of an 
intelligent system for learning is frequently taken as its immanent property 
whose nature is not discussed (Cohen et al., 1990, Curran & Keele, 1993). 
 3
The term "adaptation" (when a system chooses some program from the 
programs available at its disposal) is also used in the literature. It is often 
taken as a synonym of the notion "learning" (the adaptive behavior, an 
adaptive automat, (Hauert & Stenull, 2002, Delgado & Sole, 2000, 
Staddon, 1983, Frank, 1997) etc.). 
The adaptive behavior of agents is formalized beginning, mainly, 
from lower hierarchy levels. It was shown (Jonker et al., 2002) that all 
biochemical processes occurring in an elementary organism can be 
described in a high-level language. 
An important property of the adaptive behavior is its 
purposefulness, which becomes apparent at different levels of the 
organization of the living matter. In this hierarchy, purposes of lower levels 
are directly connected with the interaction between an organism and the 
environment in the present situation, while purposes of higher levels 
determine its long-term behavior (Burtsev, 2004). What is the source of 
purposes then? Are they preset a priori or do they appear during vital 
activities of an organism? What is the mechanism of their appearance in the 
latter case? 
The notion of "learning" has been formalized most in the theory of 
the artificial intelligence. However, "learning" is understood differently in 
different sections of the artificial intelligence. 
For example, Herbert Simon defined "learning" as "any change 
in a system, which improves the solution of a task upon its repeated 
presentation or leads to the solution of another task on the basis of the same 
data" (Luger, 2003). However, from this definition it is not clear if it 
implies a system having an invariable internal structure or a system whose 
structure can be changed at will. If, for example, the man interferes directly 
and creates actually another system instead of an existing system, will this 
be learning? Such a process obviously has nothing to do with learning, but 
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is related to another domain. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate on the 
type of the interaction between an intelligent system and the environment. 
From the analysis of the literature on the artificial intelligence it is 
possible to distinguish two types of learning depending on whether an 
intelligent system or an organism has or has not aprioristic information 
about an object. Aprioristic information implies information about an 
object, which a system had before presentation of the object. 
Let us refer to learning of the first (strong) type as learning in the 
absence of aprioristic information about an object and learning of the 
second (weak) type as learning in the presence of this information. 
All modern systems of the artificial intelligence are capable of 
learning only after the second type, i.e. in the presence of aprioristic 
information. Indeed, 
1. Heuristic methods of problem solving are based on 
aprioristic information about the object domain comprising 
the problem. The heuristics may prove to be incapable of 
finding the solution altogether. This limitation cannot be 
removed by the best heuristics (Garey & Johnson, 1979). 
The key question is whence the heuristics comes? How to 
develop a new heuristics? The theory does not answer this 
question. 
2. The recursive search represents a natural method for 
realization of such strategies of the artificial intelligence as 
the graph search. However, an exact objective should be set 
for this method to be used. If objects (even one object) are 
not defined, the recursive procedure cannot be applied 
(Luger, 2003). 
3. Production systems are used for the conflict resolution. In 
this case, it is necessary to a priori have a standard sample 
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(pattern), which determines the possibility to use rules of 
production systems (Luger, 1994).  
4. Expert systems rest on the same rules (Luger, 2003). The 
core of an expert system is a knowledge base, which 
contains knowledge from a particular applied domain. 
Knowledge in an object domain determines and updates an 
expert database (Minsky, 1987). Is it possible to imagine a 
system, which acts as an expert for itself? Obviously not, 
because a code can be corrected only when correct 
knowledge is known. 
5. Machine learning (Luger, 2003), be it symbolic, neuronet or 
emergent (genetic algorithms) learning, is based on the 
presentation of a priori preset training examples. Indeed, 
learning of a neuron network implies the assignment of 
relation weights between neurons, which is realized in a 
special regime (but not in the pattern recognition regime). 
In this case, the person, who assigns standard templates to 
this neuron network, has aprioristic information about the 
object. One more problem is how to determine that the 
system has come to the correct decision. 
Is learning of the first (strong) type possible? Can an organism (a 
system) update the knowledge base itself and adapt to unforeseen 
circumstances?  
To answer this question, we shall consider the model of an 
organism as an intelligent system. 
 
2. The model of an organism as an autonomous intelligent 
system  
 
 6
Let us define first the class of systems, which may be posed the 
problem of learning in the absence of aprioristic information about an 
object. The major property of intelligent systems, which allows this 
classification, is the method of their interaction with the environment. 
By this method, all intelligent systems can be divided into two 
classes: systems acquiring all information about the environment through 
measurements (pattern recognition) and those exposed to random effects 
when unrecognized information can be imported to a system. In the first 
case, the system is logically closed and its internal rules cannot be changed 
by a random external effect. In the second case, the system is not logically 
closed and its rules and structure can be changed randomly. An example is 
a machine assembled in a production line. If the man or another intelligent 
system decides to change the machine design, the machine may be 
imparted any property for solution of any problem. Then the "machine + 
external system" entity will be logically closed.  
This definition is similar to the notion "an autonomous system" 
(see, for example, (Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno, 2004)). However, the said 
notion has not been defined clearly enough in the literature. 
The presence of an uncontrollable external effect makes the 
optimization problem insoluble, because any degree of freedom of a system 
and, therefore, any internal operation and an object of the system can be 
changed arbitrarily. The effect of other intelligent systems may update the 
database of a system and lead to a random change of its behavior. 
However, this system will not be autonomous. In this case, the problem of 
learning is trivial: the process is fully controlled from the outside by 
another intelligent system. Therefore, the question about the source of new 
knowledge is just re-applied to another system. Then the combined system 
will be autonomous. 
The analysis of the behavior of organisms demonstrated that they 
belong to autonomous systems in the aforementioned sense: their internal 
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degrees of freedom (the nervous system and other control systems) are 
protected from direct outside effects. The state of internal degrees of 
freedom (neurons) changes thanks to measurements of environmental 
conditions, that is, the pattern recognition by receptors. 
The present study deals just with the first type of systems, which 
acquire information from the outside by the pattern recognition. 
So, let us consider an organism as a logically closed intelligent 
system (Fig. 1) having the following properties: 
 
 
Receptor 
External signal 
Effector 
Objects and 
operations  
on them 
P,Q
 
Fig.1. Model of an organism as an autonomous intelligent system 
 
Property 1: A system includes internal independent objects 
(language words) Q1 … Qn. The objects may be subject to operations P1 … 
Pm. Since the system is logically closed, neither objects nor operations on 
them can be changed due to actions from the outside. New objects cannot 
be created either by applying operations to a set of assigned objects, 
because in this case a new object will not be independent. 
 8
Property 2: A system has a receptor for acquisition of information 
about environmental conditions. A signal, which is received by the 
receptor, is compared with internal objects available in the system (patterns 
are recognized). This recognition can be pictured as a tree (a graph). 
Property 3: Some operations on the objects start effectors, i.e. the 
system performs operations on the environment. The structure of the 
system is such that all operations lead to the solution of one of a priori 
defined tasks ( )iil PQ ,Σ . The quality of the solution of each task can be 
estimated by the quality functional ( )iil PQ ,Φ , which is the larger, the 
better the task is solved. We shall assume that the structure of the system 
provides the condition of the maximum ( ) max, →Φ iil PQ . 
Property 4: A system has a memory, which may store results of 
previous measurements or intermediate operations. 
The class of the intelligent systems at hand is very wide. It includes 
all living organisms (including the man), the artificial intelligence and 
adaptive systems. 
 
3. Self-learning of a system in the absence of aprioristic 
information leads to a contradiction 
 
Let us consider a situation when a system sees a pattern, which it 
can register (measure), but cannot recognize. Also, the system has not any 
aprioristic information about the pattern.  
In this case, the recognition scheme can be pictured as follows (Fig. 
2): 
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? 
Pattern
Operation 1 Operation 3Operation 2
Objects 
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Fig.2. Tree of the recognition and decision making when an unknown 
object appears in the field of vision 
 
Statement 1: If an intelligent system possessing properties 1-4 
catches sight of a pattern Ω, which is not equivalent to any of the internal 
objects of the system, the effector cannot perform operations and actions, 
which would lead to the solution of any new task ( )iil PQ ,,1 ΩΣ +  related to 
this pattern. 
The proof: 
Two cases are possible: 
1. The pattern Ω is not equivalent to any of Qi (the pattern 
does not belong to the set of internal objects of the system). 
Then neither operation on the pattern is defined. Effectors 
will not be started. Since all tasks, which the system can 
solve, are determined only by the internal objects and 
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operations on them (property 3), the task list will not be 
updated. 
2. Let the pattern be partially identified and prove to be 
equivalent to an object in the tree node Qi. The further 
identification on the tree failed. In this case, the effector 
corresponding to the object Qi will be started. Then the 
object-defined operations can only be applied to the pattern. 
Therefore, in this case the task list will not be updated 
either. The statement has been proved.  
The problem of updating the knowledge base of the system has a 
similar solution. In terms of the proposed model, the knowledge base 
represents a set of objects, actions on them, and outcomes of those actions 
(the quality functional). 
Statement 2: An intelligent system, which possesses properties 1-
4, cannot update its knowledge base. 
The proof: A set of objects and operations on them cannot be 
updated by definition (property 1), because the objects are independent and 
operations on unrecognized patterns are not defined. The statement has 
been proved. 
Thus, we have come to the conclusion that a system (an organism) 
cannot pose new tasks when an unrecognized object appears in the 
environment. The generation of new tasks or updating of the knowledge 
base by the system contradicts its properties.  
 
3. The trial and error method 
 
Let us dwell on a widespread mechanism of learning, namely 
learning by the trial and error method. This mechanism was discussed in 
the literature more than once (Beal, 2003, Minsky, 1987, Sloman, 1993). 
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Some authors use the term "casual learning" in this sense, assuming that 
possible actions are searched randomly.  
It is easy to see however that this algorithm coincides with the 
heuristic method of the task solution (Luger, 2003) and, as it was shown in 
the foregoing, can be applied only when an intelligent system has 
aprioristic information about an object. (If this information is absent, 
nothing implies that the task will be solved by chance.) In this case, 
learning refers to the second (weak) type. Indeed, if a system (an organism) 
has an operation on an unrecognized pattern leading to the solution of at 
least one task, then (according to property 3) the unrecognized pattern 
should belong to the set of internal objects of the system. That is, the 
system includes a truncated mechanism of the recognition when the tree of 
objects contains a smaller number of edges and tops. 
An important conclusion follows from the above reasoning: all 
behavior programs of organisms (including the man) are congenital. This 
conclusion contradicts today's theoretical concepts that only part of 
behavior programs of animals is laid in genes, while the rest of the 
programs are acquired during learning. 
So, just one of the aprioristic programs, which suits best a given 
situation, is chosen during learning of the man and animals. 
The above reasoning does not mean in the least that the 
environment plays an insignificant role in the behavior of animals and the 
man. Experiments with enzygotic twins demonstrated (Thompson et al., 
2002) that the role of the environment is considerable. Of course, this 
statement does not contradict the main conclusion of the present study that 
all behavior programs of organisms are congenital. With respect to twins, 
for example, this means the following: although both twins have the same 
congenital programs of behavior, some programs will be started for one of 
the twins and other programs for the other (if the latter is in another 
environment). 
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4.   Transfer of Experience from Parents to Descendants 
 
Let us consider the case when an organism receives new 
information from its parents or other animals. Can it adapt itself to new 
conditions in this case? Considering what has been said above, the answer 
is negative. 
It is important to note that in this case too the organism receives 
information via receptors. Therefore, any other organism (a member of the 
pack, the parent, etc.) is interpreted as part of the environment. 
Consequently, the aforementioned "measurement - recognition – decision 
making" scheme holds. Whichever actions a parent makes, they can be 
adequately interpreted only in one case: when the signal has been 
recognized, that is, has been compared with a standard sample. This 
comparison is possible in turn only if the standard sample has already been 
available in the organism (has been congenital). 
What is the role of the experience transfer between animals? This 
role obviously reduces to triggering of aprioristic (congenital) programs of 
behavior. Indeed, if the environment has uncertainties, an important 
question is which programs to start. The start of behavior programs, which 
are not adequate to changes in the environment, can be catastrophic for an 
organism. Therefore, we shall consider a situation (which is most frequent) 
when errors occur during reception of the environment. 
 
5. Repeated measurements as the basis of a conditioned reflex  
 
Why then a certain type of the behavior is established not 
immediately after appearance of a new pattern, but only after its repeated 
occurrence? This can be easily explained if one considers that the quality 
functional of actions depends on the number of measurements. On the one 
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hand, measurements require consumption and, on the other hand, the 
measurement error decreases as the number of measurements grows. 
Therefore, the quality functional of measurements can have an extremum 
(Melkikh, 2005). In other words, a system (an organism), which is in a 
complex environment, may find it unfavorable to immediately change its 
trajectory as changes occur in the environment, but prefers to perform a set 
of measurements and only then alter its behavior. More detailed 
calculations are given in a paper by Melkikh (2005). 
Thus, repeated measurements of environmental conditions by a 
system are intended to reduce the error during operation of aprioristic 
programs. The problem of the acquisition of new information during 
formation of a conditioned reflex is covered in more detail elsewhere 
(Melkikh, 2002). It was shown that: 
- an organism should recognize a pattern to form a 
conditioned reflex,  
- an organism should have a program for the work with the 
pattern, which, in particular, should instruct that an effector 
should be started after a given pattern recurs a certain 
number of times, 
- in this sense, conditioned reflexes do not differ 
fundamentally from unconditioned ones. The only 
difference is the number of pattern presentations, 
- in this case, new programs cannot be created. 
 
6. The algorithm of the organism behavior under 
uncertainty conditions  
 
We shall use the aforementioned properties of an organism as an 
autonomous intelligent system and construct a model of the behavior of an 
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organism in conditions of environmental uncertainty. In this case, the 
algorithm of actions of an organism can be presented as a set of procedures: 
1. Measure (X,n)→Q. The measure procedure has a pattern 
of the environment at the input and the object, to which 
the external pattern was identified in measurements, at 
the output. 
2. Do (P,Q). The action procedure (the control is transferred 
to effectors). 
3. Memory (P,Q). The procedure of recording to the 
memory and memory read. 
4. DoWhile(Φ > Φ0). The procedure of comparing the 
quality functional of the action with its maximum value. 
As a result, aprioristic programs are ordered. 
5. Random(P,Q). The procedure of a random selection of an 
aprioristic program. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was shown that an organism cannot adapt itself to unforeseen 
circumstances, solve new tasks, update its knowledge base, or learn upon 
presentation of an unknown object. All behavior programs of the man and 
animals are congenital and cannot be acquired from learning. A 
conditioned reflex can be modeled as a series of consecutive 
measurements, which is intended to reduce the error during decision 
making. In this case, an organism does not develop new programs. 
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